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Mind reading, mind guessing or mental-state attribution? 
The puzzle of John Burnside’s A Summer of Drowning 
John Burnside’s A Summer of Drowning (2011) is a perplexing novel with perplexing representations of 
minds. In fiction, third-person narrators liberally exhibit thoughts, feelings and minds of all characters, yet 
in Burnside’s novel, it is the first-person narrator Liv, a teenage girl who steps forward as a seasoned reader 
of minds. However, the novel is not a strong case for such a “folk-psychological” capacity to understand 
other minds, possibly with the help of the “Theory of Mind”, suggested in different versions by Lisa 
Zunshine (2006), Alan Palmer (2004) and David Herman (2011), among many others. There is the unnerving 
problem that Liv seems to read minds all too perfectly, even the minds of people she has hardly met, while 
at the same time failing drastically to understand the two people she knows and loves most – her mother 
and her surrogate father and neighbor Kyrre Opdahl. Daniel Hutto (2008, 46) suggests that “by far the best 
and most reliable” way of attaining knowledge about other people’s reasons is the horse’s mouth method, 
yet precisely this basic folk-psychological approach of conversation is interpreted by Liv as “intrusion”. To 
add confusion and complexity, the more unnatural the events of the novel become, the less reliable and 
the more paranoid the narration becomes. As an attempt at fostering some clarity, I develop an idea of 
“mind reading” – or more exactly mind-attribution – as a discursive-mental strategy in the service of 
diminishing the value of present partners of social interaction.  
The story takes place on the distant Norwegian island of Kvaløya, which is situated near Tromsø and the 
Nordic Circle, during a short summer. Liv’s mother is a prominent artist who achieved her position after 
withdrawing from Oslo to the solitude of the island. The teenage girl adores her mother as much as she 
despises all the banality of life in Tromsø and, in general, everywhere outside her home and the island. The 
story begins just after Liv has finished school and is considering what to do about her future. Two brothers, 
Mats and Harald Sigfridsson, both from the same school, about the same age as Liv, are found mystically 
drowned within a few weeks, during calm weather, without any plausible explanation or even a reason why 
they had been rowing a stolen boat at night. A British tourist, Martin Crosbie, comes to hire a nearby 
cottage, only to disappear later without a trace. Liv’s only friend, Kyrre Opdahl has a history of telling 
Nordic folklore stories to Liv; and he suggests now that huldra, an infamous magical female character of 
folklore fame, who is able to enchant gullible men and drown them is behind the tragedies. Even though 
Kyrre and other locals, and even the narrator herself, continually repeat that huldra is more of an idea than 
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a real person, as the summer proceeds, Liv begins increasingly to identify huldra with a real girl of her own 
age, Maia.   
In addition to the incidences of drowning, a much more personal and profound turbulence shakes Liv in the 
form of letters she receives, hides and wants to burn in the midsummer bonfire. A woman called Kate 
Thompson writes from England, informing Liv that her father is seriously ill and wants to meet her. Liv 
succeeds in delaying her visit so long, however, that her father dies on the night before her arrival at the 
hospital. There, a peculiar contrast between high-level mind reading and systematic ignorance of folk-
psychological expectations characterize her meetings with Thompson.  
On one level, the novel offers cues to reading it as a romantic – and unmistakably unnatural – saga about 
the puzzling Nordic midsummer light, a great artist flourishing in the solitude of the island, the magic figure 
of huldra enchanting and destroying naive men, and only a single girl being perspicuous enough to see 
through all of this tragedy. After the summer, Liv decides to continue living with her mother, and devote 
her life to mapping the landscape between her mother’s house and Kyrre’s now empty house. Drawing 
maps from stone to stone, from tree to tree may possibly qualify as art for art’s sake; at least it completes 
Liv’s withdrawal from the trivia of the social world. “I have no wish to do anything, no wish to create. I am a 
witness, pure and simple, an unaffiliated, lifelong spy”, as she has it (50). From another perspective, this 
closure can be configured as a foreclosure of life and mind.  
On a darker level of reading, one can thus identify a series of phenomena that gradually abolish – or at least 
seriously undermine – the story of the Romantic North. The first of these is Liv’s disturbingly quick and 
detailed mind-attribution. I begin by analyzing some of the most blatant cases. The second theme is Liv’s 
recurrent strategic use of mind-attribution in protecting herself from genuine encounters in emotionally 
demanding situations. The third feature, in support of the previous ones, is the realization that once and 
again Liv misreads her mother and Kyrre, the two people she should actually know most thoroughly, on 
central issues concerning her own life. The fourth problem is Liv’s reluctance to share the facts about her 
visit to England, even with her mother and Kyrre, and finally her wild visions of Maia as huldra, including 
the visions of huldra catching and destroying Kyrre. In a rather paradoxical way, and in contrast to the 
invasive reporting of other minds, Liv fails to report adequately on her own tragedies of the summer, her 
qualia, as well as her own potential participation in Martin Crosbie’s or Kyrre Opdahl’s disappearance. In a 
worrisome way, she seems to resist contributing to any “social” or “intermental” mind (Palmer 2004, 2010); 
and equally, the “social mind” of her nearest environment resists confirming her unnatural version of the 
events.  
3 
Moments of mind reading 
As Dorrit Cohn (1978, 7) maintains, “[N]arrative fiction is the only literary genre, as well as the only kind of 
narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, perceptions of a person other than the speaker can be 
portrayed.” Later theories of mind-attribution have challenged the validity of this “exceptionality thesis”, by 
acknowledging the continuous sensitivity humans regularly have as regards the intentions and emotional 
states of their partners of conversation (see Zunshine 2006; Palmer 2004, 2010, 2011; Herman 2011). David 
Herman (2011, 11) most explicitly argues against the exceptionality of fiction by first noticing how “fictional 
minds are accessible but not transparent”, and secondly, that “[e]very-day minds are not transparent, but 
they are accessible” (also Palmer 2010, 44).  
The key argument of this chapter is that these general claims do not go far enough in clarifying the issue of 
accessibility of minds.  Instead of mere abstract claims about equal or differing accessibility, we most 
obviously need arguments about degrees of accessibility. Burnside’s novel (from now on, Drowning) 
provides us with excellent material for testing empirically credible, everyday mind-attribution, taking place 
within the storyworld of the novel. The narrator’s own mind is far from transparent, to the point that it 
seems to be only minimally accessible even to the narrator herself. The whole interpretation of the novel 
depends on how far the reader is willing to trust in Liv’s sincerity and capacity for reading minds. The most 
critical point is still not about reading minds, occasionally, incorrectly, not even about resorting sometimes 
to wild mind guessing. The issue is about the strategic malevolence of mind-attribution, a kind of mind 
projection in the service of one’s own imagined world (see Tytti Rantanen, in this volume).   
Departing from many of the early works on mind reading (Zunshine 2006; Palmer 2004), my discussion is 
not based on the cognitive “Theory of Mind” (here, I largely follow Iversen 2013). One particular problem 
with the Theory of Mind is the obvious difficulty of drawing its limits of credibility. If Liv has an excellent 
Theory of Mind, as daughter of a major artist, on what grounds could we challenge her expert capacity to 
read other minds so fluently? In this chapter, I discuss the understanding of other minds from the more 
general perspective of folk psychology. A broad meaning of the concept of folk psychology is outlined by 
Jerome Bruner (1990), who uses the term to describe the script-like cultural knowledge about canonical 
sequences of events, and the narrative means of dealing with the deviations of the expected. The more 
narrow meaning of the terms only refers to the understanding that people have different desires and 
reasons motivating their action. Mind-attribution, in this strict meaning, also focuses in evaluating the 
desires and reasons of the studied person. Hutto (2007) argues, in his Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH), 
that children originally learn that human agents have desires and reasons for actions by listening to fairy 
tales and other narratives. To understand oneself as an agent, in other words, is a narrative achievement 
for Hutto. This socio-cultural understanding of folk psychology, and the consequent capacity to understand 
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minds, allows questioning the credibility of Liv’s mind reading. I am well aware that this reading is based on 
the use of my own folk-psychological knowledge, simply because there is, and cannot be any scientifically 
composed handbook of folk psychology. The purpose is to make of the mind readings topoi of argument, as 
something that can be argued, negated, or further elaborated. This kind of argumentation is possible 
because folk psychology is based on shared cultural knowledge, not on any theory package working in the 
mind. 
Alan Palmer (2004, 130–169) suggests the useful concepts of “mind beyond the skin” and “social mind”, in 
defending the “externalist” understanding of mind against the old idea that mind is confined inside the 
brain and skin.  “An important part of the social mind is our capacity for intermental thought. Such thinking 
is joint, group, shared, or collective, as opposed to intramental, or individual or private thought. It is also 
known as socially distributed, situated, or extended cognition, and also as intersubjectivity”, as Palmer 
(2010, 41) recently argues. However, I am not primarily interested in locating such intermental units, as 
Palmer seems to be. In Drowning, one of the chilliest aspects of the narration is the realization of the 
gradual disappearance of the intermental confirmation of reality.  
Hutto (2004, 2008) specifically criticizes mind reading as “spectator sport,” meaning a distant third person 
perspective on other minds. In most cases, he argues, the most reliable understanding of other minds is 
achieved from second-person encounters and actual conversation. Liv looks out of her window one night 
and sees the Englishman, for the first time.  In the light of the midsummer night, she finds something akin 
to a ghost-like unreality in him: “at the first glance, it seemed to me that he was a man without substance, 
not a ghost so much than an illusion, a phantasm in which he himself scarcely believed” (Drowning, 45, 
italics added). It is not merely Liv’s own perception; it is as if it were Crosbie himself having these ideas of 
not believing in his own existence. Looking at Crosbie, from some distance in the light night, Liv continues 
her appraisals: 
If Mother had been there, she would have said he was sensitive, or delicate, but to my mind there 
was more to it than that, something that had to do with my first impression of his being hurt or lost, 
like some animal that has strayed from its own habitat and finds itself exposed… (Drowning, 46) 
The narrator takes the liberty to employ thought report (Palmer 2004, 75–86) or psycho-narration in 
accounting for the people she meets. Using side-shadowing (Morson 1994) and hypothetical narration 
(Riessman 1990), Liv invites the image of her mother’s mind and evaluates the visitor and his character 
from her mother’s supposed perspective, before suggesting her own interpretation. The essential 
difference between these separate moments of mind reading is between the second-person and third-
person perspectives, in the sense that Liv has a long and intimate second-person history of observing her 
mother, interacting with her, making her observations largely but not exclusively reliable, while she neither 
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has previous knowledge about Crosbie, nor does she have a history of dialogs with him. The reported 
thoughts, in other words, cannot carry along any layers of Crosbie’s own speech. Nevertheless, she is fast in 
appraising Crosbie already from afar. During their first and only proper conversation, Liv makes further 
evaluations: 
He laughed, rather sadly I thought. Though it was always hard to know, with Martin Crosby, how real 
any of his supposed emotions were. He had worked long and hard on seeming innocent, I think. 
(Drowning, 56, italics added) 
Liv and Crosbie meet only a few times and discuss properly only this single time, yet the narrator knowingly 
uses the expression “it was always hard to know, with Martin Crosbie,” as if they had a long history of 
sharing thoughts. The observation concerning the difficulty of detecting real emotions remains distantly 
within the range of potential capacities even during a short encounter, by adeptly reading the embodied 
emotional states. The second part, “he had worked hard on seeming innocent,” is connected to the time of 
narration in the present tense. Nevertheless, it is such a complex statement about the history of Crosbie’s 
control of emotions that it is not credible without a real history of conversations and observations. How, 
indeed, do you tell people apart, who simply look innocent, and those who have worked hard to achieve 
the ability to look innocent?  
Another instance of radical mind reading occurs when Liv meets a journalist who came to the island to 
interview her mother. The acute issues here are jealousy (her mother had better not take incidental visitors 
seriously) and sex (who would be worthy of her mother?). Liv stays in the adjoining room overhearing the 
course of the interview, and becomes increasingly worried because of her mother’s tone and an intimacy 
she had not heard earlier (78). In other words, the mind reader already has a stance to protect, an attitude 
preceding the actual meeting with Frank Verne. As always, Liv is swift in her scrutiny of Verne. After a few 
words of tentative pleasantries, we have a powerful example of Liv’s mastery in reading minds: 
…and though he was smiling, I could see that he was studying me, trying to work out what I was 
hiding. Because I was hiding something. I had to be. Everybody had something they kept hidden and 
the only difference between one person and another was how long it took to figure out. That was 
what he was thinking. I could see that he was sure of this simple fact and the thought passed through 
my mind that I would either puzzle him or disappoint him, because I wasn’t hiding anything at all. 
(Drowning, 81) 
The passage has a truly complex propositional structure, a real private theory of other minds, presented by 
resorting to free indirect speech in the thought representation. Verne (like many others, obviously) believes 
that every person has a secret. Just by looking, it is possible to reveal this secret (as she thinks Verne 
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believes). Verne believes that Liv has a secret. Verne is looking at Liv in order to find out the secret. Verne 
will be disappointed, because Liv does not have a secret. The crucial question here concerns the particular 
version of folk psychology motivating these propositions. If we think for a second about a visiting journalist 
who is professionally, intellectually and erotically interested in the artist mother, what might he be seeking 
while looking at the daughter? Brunerian (1990) common sense would recommend that he – at least – is 
trying to figure out whether the daughter is inclined to complicate his plans, or is she already an adult-
enough person to be conversed with on equal footing? Alternatively, he may simply want to have an image 
of her character, to learn how to possibly converse with her in future. How about gently comparing mother 
and daughter? From Verne’s point of view, of course, Liv already has a secret, the secret worry she has 
because of the warmth in her mother’s voice. Rather than any folk psychology, one can detect in the 
passage a piece of alarmingly paranoid psychology. It is, after all, Liv herself who has excelled at spying and 
detecting the secrets of Kyrre’s visitors. In this sense, Liv is straightforwardly projecting her own mindset 
onto Verne’s mind. There is one remarkable aspect in all these mind reading episodes. They never 
encourage a sustained exchange of ideas or any attempts at testing her interpretations. Rather, they work 
as excuses to finish the conversation.  
In total contrast to the near mystical clarity in reading other people’s minds, the narrator turns opaque in 
explaining her interest in “spying” during the summer. She used to spy on Kyrre’s visitors, because they 
mystified her. Here we almost receive a description of folk psychology, in the sense of Bruner (1990) or 
Hutto (2004), but in the negative. She affirms that she does not understand the visitor’s desires, fears or 
wishes, or what stories they wanted to recount to her. Rather than trying the horse’s mouth method in 
understanding others, Liv choses understanding from a distance, spying with the help of technical tools. 
The disclosure above equals admitting that she is not, after all, very well equipped for understanding 
others. Shaun Gallagher (2007, 213–214) writes that in “most intersubjective situations” we indeed have 
“direct understanding of another person’s intentions” because they are “explicitly expressed in their 
embodied actions and their expressive behaviors.” Visual reading of embodied action and facial gestures 
can indeed reveal a lot about another person’s intentions, but again, the emphasis is on second-person 
encounters, not on the third-person reading from afar. Gallagher, of course, does not refer here to any such 
conceptually rich reading of another person’s ideas as Liv presented above.  
However, Liv seems to understand precious little about her own spying mind.  She decides not to spy on 
Crosbie, yet she continues with it immediately. As a consequence, the narrator resorts to a weirdly negative 
narration, a technique she often uses in distancing her motivations from her actual behaviour. She 
proclaims that “she had no desire to watch”, and watches nevertheless, and next that she “didn’t want to 
know” the contents of Crosbies shopping bags but, a moment later, reports them in detail (Drowning, 51).  
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At any rate, the recurrent negative explanation means that she does not need to give any proper 
explanations about her spying. This recurrent use of these negatives tell the reader that Liv may not be 
considered as the most reliable narrator, not at least when it comes to accounting for her own mind. A 
similar ambiguity shadows her relationship with the drowned Mats Sigfridsson. At first, curiously, Liv claims 
that Mats was “nothing” to her, he simply was a boy from her class at school. Then she mentions how 
“remote from the rest of the world” Mats was. Not that she knew him well, but she had thought that Mats 
might have been able to understand the way she “saw the world”. The bells start ringing when the narrator 
next declares that she is “not talking about a romance here” (30) and that she “wasn’t attracted to Mats” 
(31). Who had made such claims, and what exactly is motivating this continuous counter-argumentation? 
These repeated negatives invite the possibility that she, after all, was emotionally much more engaged than 
she was able or willing to divulge. The narrator, ten years afterward, is still working hard at speculating on 
the reader’s mind, in an attempt at rejecting all possible doubts about her.  
 
Intrusion and interaction 
Liv had received binoculars as a 13th birthday present, and since then she had been spying on Kyrre’s 
solitary visitors – never families, never couples. She considered this spying to be harmless and kind; indeed, 
she explains that her basic motivation behind the spying was that she “wanted them to be happy” 
(Drowning, 27). Nevertheless, once she sees Crosbie driving away, she is immediately at his door, “feeling 
slightly guilty”, but after finding the door not locked, she slips in, ready to search the house (Drowning, 
132). She finds Crosbie’s computer unlocked, and goes on to survey the contents. She finds photographs of 
normally dressed girls of about her age (Drowning, 134). Gradually, a whole archive of high quality 
photographs portraying young girls is revealed, including some photos of her. There is nothing indecent in 
the pictures, and they were not about spying in Liv’s sense of the term. Dangerously, however, the girls 
were objects of desire, as Liv has it. Therefore, she interprets the photos as theft, not as innocent spying, 
and without a second thought she decides to destroy all the photo archives that Crosbie has on his 
computer. So much for only wishing those she spied on “to be happy.”   
The incident highlights a fundamental contradiction in Liv’s thought. She allows herself to spy on other 
people, enter their homes and computers, administer corrections, and all this does not constitute any kind 
of ethically problematic instance of intrusion. On the other hand, she herself hates to be observed by 
others, and later has feelings of being followed.  As a reference to the sexual theme of huldra, she is 
appalled while encountering the phenomenon of desire (more exactly, while meeting something she 
interprets as desire). It is not that she herself is merely not interested in sexuality, as she claims, she is 
actively and systematically against sexuality, despises it, and wants to censor other people’s attitudes and 
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behaviour when possible. The most curious aspect of her intrusion into Crosbie’s computer is that Liv never 
considers the consequences of her intrusion, for example when thinking about Crosbie’s sudden 
disappearance from the island. Despite the fact that Crosbie’s car and belongings all disappear at the same 
time, Liv does not think for a second about the effects of her own agency or the consequent 
embarrassment or hurt, but accuses huldra/Maia instead.  
Liv’s orderly time of spying and looking at picture books is interrupted when she receives a letter from Kate 
Thompson, informing her of her father’s illness. Against obvious folk-psychological expectations, Liv does 
not disclose the contents of the letter to her mother, and her mother, within the range of this somewhat 
exceptional family dynamics, does not ask anything about it either. Liv indeed praises her mother as a 
person who will not “intrude” on her private matters (Drowning, 65). Asking questions, showing an interest 
and discussing daily concerns may thus constitute an intrusion into her life. Her mother is not at all like 
Thompson, who wrote the letter. However, even the narrator’s critical account informs one of the highly 
discrete way Thompson is writing, using a mode that social psychologists have called “doing delicacy” 
(Nijnatten  & Suoninen 2014). The first letter does not ask Liv to do anything, it simply explains that her 
father, named Arild Frederiksen, lives in England and is seriously ill. Thompson asks Liv not to see her as an 
intruder, even though she is a stranger, and identifies herself as a well-intended stranger. 
That struck me as funny. How could this woman think it was well intentioned, to write such a letter 
and send it, out of the blue, to someone she did not know? (Drowning, 66) 
“Such a letter”, constitutes in Liv’s world a violation of protected canonicity, which is so self-evident that it 
needs no further explication. A letter coming from outside the closed sphere of her life without prior 
consent is questionable. If her mother does not speak about her father, no one else is entitled to do so. The 
choice of words is noteworthy. A letter informs her of the existence and illness of her father, yet the 
writer’s intentions sound “funny”. Ten years later, the narrator still airs her wish to have burnt all the 
letters in a midsummer night’s bonfire. The letter indeed had been “an intrusion”; and she only wanted “to 
be left alone”. A man is dying, yet Liv keeps thinking that telling her the facts “was not fair” (Drowning, 71).  
The letters themselves do not contain any such violation of folk-psychological canonicity, which would call 
for an explanation of reasons, or even motivate Liv’s harsh reaction. Rather, it is Liv’s righteous and hurt 
reaction that raises questions and calls for better explanations. For one thing, at the time of the story, she 
is somewhat too old to be the stereotypical, sullen and totally egocentric teenager; for another, the 
narrator, a whole decade later, still does not take any more distance from this peculiar attitude. There is 
not a drop of empathy towards the seriously ill man or Kate Thompson; the only person needing to be 
pitied is Liv, so cruelly disturbed. She uses a lot of energy in vain speculations about the seriousness of the 
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illness and her father’s role behind the invitations. In other words, she is not able to consider the invitation 
without her paranoid fears of inordinate manipulation. 
In her second letter, Thompson specifically clarifies the huge significance her visit would have. Again, in a 
manner of carefully “doing delicacy” (“but if you could find the time to come”), Thompson tries to adopt 
Liv’s perspective, even to accept her possible resistance before explaining how immensely important her 
visit would be to her father (Drowning, 120). Thompson urges Liv to see the situation from the perspective 
of the dying man, and uses folk-psychological arguments in the sense Bruner (1990) uses the term. Liv, on 
the other hand, remains totally untouched and sees the issue firmly from the perspective of what primarily 
interests herself. “What surprised me even more was her assumption that I would want to see my father, 
that I would be curious, at the very least, to know what he was like. Yet I wasn’t curious. Not in the least” 
(Drowning, 120). However, only a modicum of empathy and compassion is what is requested. Liv, who in 
her own domestic environment is curious enough to spy on her neighbours and to break into Crosbie’s 
computer and reveal his secrets, declares now total indifference as regards her own father.  
Against all her expectations, her mother, after hearing of the contents of the letters, immediately and 
emphatically encourages her to go to England. Even in the case of her mother, she turns out to be rather a 
lousy mind reader. During their drive to the airport, they meet Liv’s father-substitute, Kyrre Opdahl. Her 
mother lightly announces that Liv is going to England, in order to meet her father. This announcement 
discloses a new, shocking misreading of her mother’s mind: 
That shocked me. I had assumed she wouldn’t want to talk about him. After all, she had been 
pretending he didn’t exist for years. (Drowning 166, first italics added) 
The “shock” reveals that Liv is working with a set of assumptions about her father that her adored mother 
does not share at all. After returning home, Liv remains angry at her mother – but not for the earlier 
“pretention”, but for the way she had now openly discussed the journey to Kyrre. After the journey, Liv also 
learns that it was not her father who had unfairly rejected her and her mother; on the contrary, the father 
simply did not fit into her mother’s life dedicated to the arts. Nevertheless, learning these facts does not 
change anything in Liv’s thought; at least, there is no triggering of any self-critical reflection about her harsh 
reaction to her father’s death. Instead, all this belongs to the information she still wants to wipe away from 
her consciousness during the time of the narration. Her mother, instead, now sees no problem with her 
meeting with Arild Fredriksen; in contrast, she keeps telling her what a good man he was. The reader 
cannot miss the grave incongruence in her mother’s behaviour. Why did she not tell Liv about her father 
earlier; why was she so stubbornly evasive for years? Liv does not ponder on this. Instead she adopts the 
old position of forgetting the father as the natural stance, and a stance that binds her and her mother most 
safely together.  
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Eventually, Liv manages to defer her visit to the hospital so long that she never meets her father alive. 
While arriving during the previous night, she thinks, like a stubborn teenager, that even though she could 
still go to the hospital, one night would not make any difference. The big issue was not to rush to the 
hospital, because she “was tired” and “felt damp and slightly grimy” (Drowning, 175–176). In the face of 
her father’s coming death, the acute issue is how she feels bodily. At the hospital, this self-righteous girl 
does not want to see the body of her father (again a potential threat to her world view); instead she insists 
on leaving the hospital straightaway. When Thompson does not let her escape immediately, the narrator 
explains that it was Thompson who “needed something more” (Drowning, 184). Liv sticks to her strong 
understanding about Kate Thompson as an intruder, yet Thompson manages to have a conversation with 
her. During this singular personal encounter with Thompson, Liv uses mind-attribution in a determined 
way. She has just lost her chance to meet her father alive, ignoring her father’s wish to see her at least once 
before his death. These are not concerns that seem to worry Liv at all, neither at the time of the story, nor 
at the time of narration a decade on, because she did not want to leave her island in the first place. After 
all, she did not invite these people into her life. Kate Thompson wants to tell her about her father, while Liv 
focuses on not listening. She is not the least open for human communication; instead she thinks the whole 
conversation only serves Thompson’s needs. In her arrogance (“I couldn’t help thinking”) she translates 
Thompson’s attempt at talking to her only as a sign of her loneliness, of not having anybody else to talk to 
about the deceased. After diagnosing Thompson’s loneliness, she proceeds into far-fetched observations 
about the misery of their past life: 
…I suddenly had an overwhelming sense of loneliness, a sense of a sad, slightly dismayed couple […]
but I knew they had come together, not because of something they had shared but out of common 
sense their best days were over, a common feeling that whatever they had wished for in life hadn’t 
quite materialised. (Drowning, 194, italics added) 
Even though the existence, life and death of her father would not have meant anything to her, the above 
passage is weird, because Kate Thompson’s talk would still be entirely understandable and well-motivated: 
even after the father’s death, Thompson wanted to connect Liv to him somehow, to give her something to 
remember. However, Liv’s mind works with a different agenda entirely. Without any prior information, 
joint experience, communication or extensive life experience in general, she is capable of attributing 
loneliness and a sad life to a person who has just lost her partner.  Characteristically, the narrator first 
minimizes her own responsibility for her own thoughts with the idiom “I couldn’t help thinking”. 
Nevertheless the emphatic claim that she somehow knew how “they had come together”, for definitely 
miserable reasons, and not for sharing something more profound. These are drastic claims and cannot be 
based on any mind reading (note that the whole episode consists in Liv’s rejection of all folk-psychological 
expectations of decent behaviour; now she should have perfect command of folk psychology in reading 
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Thompson’s mind). Now they rather appear as malevolent mind-attribution. By attributing this sordid life to 
Kate Thompson (and her father), she actively closes her ears and eyes both to the actual conversation and 
to the death of her father, no longer needing to take these seriously. Attributing miserable histories and 
ideas to other minds, therefore, is for her an effective mental and discursive strategy of downplaying the 
relevance of the other. Desperately, she sticks to the imagined, mythical story about her mother and 
father, and cannot attribute any value to her father and his actual life outside the sphere of her mother.  
 
Displacements and paranoia 
As successful as Liv was at effectively evading her father and Kate Thompson, the trip to England was not 
without consequences. After leaving the hospital, a haunting feeling of being followed creeps into Liv. After 
all, she feels guilty, but not because of her own behaviour; she feels guilt towards her mother. She suspects 
that, just by listening to Kate Thompson, she has been part of an attempted betrayal towards her mother 
(Drowning, 203). In the hospital, Liv had offered her gravely misleading explanation of Arild’s disappearance 
from her mother’s, and her own life. Yet, Liv is not the least worried about having understood the facts of 
the story incorrectly, she is worried about Thompson’s (presumed and attributed) thought that her mother 
had misinformed her about her father (Drowning, 244). So far, she had built all her reactions to her father’s 
state on her fictions about her parent’s story, whereas now she only feels guilty because she was listening 
to a story that might compromise, somehow, the integrity of her mother and her stories.  
Before leaving her hotel, while having her breakfast, Liv sees, outside in the garden, a small girl lingering 
there, despite the wet weather. At first glance, the girl’s face looks angelic and pleasant but, suddenly, “the 
look of her face turned to a grimace of utter, violent hatred, not just of me, but everything and everyone” 
(Drowning, 220). Liv feels that the girl is somehow familiar, but does not understand how. When she raises 
the alarm for the personnel to check out the girl, no one can see any child around. Again, the outraged and 
hateful little girl is out there, haunting innocent Liv, and observed only by Liv. What she did or said during 
her visit is not the slightest problem; the real problem is the experience of being followed, the 
“preposterous” ideas of Kate Thompson, and the hateful girl who comes to disturb her on the last morning.  
No wonder then that the next section of the novel is entitled “huldra”. Liv returns home, but does not want 
to share her experiences with anybody. “The last thing I wanted was a meaningful conversation about Arild 
Fredriksen’s death” (Drowning, 229). Liv wants to remain unseen, even abandoning her spying. Yet, she 
happens to see Crosbie – and now with huldra. Of course, what she perceives is Martin Crosbie in the 
company of Maia – who is now tightly identified as huldra – and an obvious affair is blossoming between 
the two. Alas, this is not the only affair that comes to shock her (Drowning, 230– 231). 
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The narrator keeps insisting that her mother does not live in full solitude, because every Saturday 
afternoon she has an artistic tea party, gathering a small group of local artists and intellectuals. Liv’s 
attitude towards the group is twofold: ironically and condescendingly she calls the men “suitors”, seeing 
them as necessary but slightly comical pawns who witness her mother’s grandeur as an artist, thinker, and 
desired beauty.  In this game, her mother is the one who sends the men off, lightly, and concentrates then 
exclusively on her artistic work. Of course, the very name “suitors”, semi-consciously, invites the image of 
the eventually returning Odysseus. After Arild’s death, this is of course not going to happen. In contrast 
Ryvold, one of the most valued regulars comes to the house to say goodbye, and purposefully when Liv’s 
mother is absent. By coincidence, he had met the lover of his youth, and they had decided to give a try to a 
new life together. Liv’s reaction to this news is intense, emotional and negative. She is disappointed with 
Ryvold and blurts out: “And I always thought it was Mother you were in love with” (Drowning, 254). Liv sees 
his departure as “betrayal”, not so much of her mother, but of himself, as “if he had settled for something 
less than he deserved” (Drowning, 255).   
Ryvold is committing the same mistake as Liv’s father, accepting something less valuable than her mother. 
In order to be honest with himself, Ryvold should have preferred this once-a-week meeting with an 
admirable but inaccessible woman to a real-life spousal relationship. Later, when Liv tells her mother about 
the visit, she curiously omits the part about the “girl”, as if it were a purported insult to her mother. On the 
same evening, her mother confirms that she had never wanted marriage, with Arild or anybody else. 
Instead of trying to think or talk through these new facts of life, Liv swiftly moves to the delusional side of 
her world. She wakes up in the night, looks at the meadows and feels that a new story has started, being 
part of an unknown world and unknown logic. For Liv, stories seem to take place following their own 
intrinsic logic, existing before the narrators and narration. The possibility that her own mind would be the 
primary source of this emerging story never occurs to her. 
As a consequence, Liv takes her binoculars, offers her regular disclaimer on Crosbie’s boring and “tawdry 
romance”, and then nevertheless starts spying him. What she sees is that Crosbie has taken out Kyrre’s 
boat, in the company of Maia, and is radiating of unnatural happiness. In this troublesome happiness, 
Crosbie seems to be the double of Ryvold and her father. While Liv looks away for a second, Crosbie has 
disappeared and the surface of the water is calm. Liv runs to the shore, being sure that Crosbie has been 
drowned, but without raising the alarm. Later, there is a weird encounter with Maia, Liv and her mother, 
but clearly no shared account emerges of what has happened. Liv tests her story about the drowning, but 
her mother is not convinced. Liv realizes that her mother no longer believes her but is rather convinced that 
Liv is “seeing things” (Drowning, 269–270), and begins, accordingly, to treat Liv as a patient. It is worth 
comparing the speed with which Liv has intervened in Crosbie’s supposed drowning with her slow reaction 
and even resistance to her real father’s illness and dying. One possible way of explaining this incongruence 
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is that the mere existence of her father, independent of her mother, seriously threatened her phantasy, 
while the whole “drowning” takes place within her safe phantasy world.  
Earlier in the day, Liv had witnesses Ryvold leaving the suitors. She hears her mother confirm Kate 
Thompson’s version about her separation from Arild. Her image about the small social world she mostly – 
and exclusively – appreciates, turns out to be based on phantasy. Despite her expert capacity to read alien 
minds, she has failed drastically in understanding the social world nearest to her. Instead of considering this 
rupture, her interest turns to the malevolent huldra, the vicious and dangerous principle of female 
sexuality. From this night onwards, her world grows increasingly apart from her mother’s, and from 
everybody else’s world as well. As the narrator, at the end of the novel reveals: “I’m not crazy – I know 
enough, after all, not to talk about these things to the living…” (Drowning, 328). Surely, we readers do not 
inhabit the same world as those living in the novel.  
Her mother’s betrayal  
In Liv’s world, Crosbie is drowned and dead, Maia an enemy and a grave threat to her peace. While Liv is 
recovering from the previous encounter, resting in her room, her mother brings Maia into the house, to sit 
for her as a model. The narrator frames the setting like a true horror story, full of danger, having an alien, 
hostile presence with alien odours inside the house. This is one of the few instances when Liv is both angry 
and disappointed with her mother, who simply ignores Maia’s dangerousness, asking plainly if Liv does not 
like her (Drowning, 279). They soon enter into a discussion about the night when Liv “saw” the drowning. 
The negotiations about reality are delicate and careful here. Liv’s mother agrees that something awful had 
happened, but she insists that it had happened to Maia as well. Liv quickly discounts this existence of 
diverging versions of reality by explaining that Maia must have been able to tell her own version of events 
earlier and more convincingly to her mother. The paranoid logic1 is watertight, and so no further argument 
or observation can challenge the phantasy about the vicious huldra any longer. 
Within her paranoid script, Liv soon decides to “reclaim her house”, that is, to drive Maia out of the house. 
This activity, of course, is somewhat absurd if we believe that Maia is the dangerous and powerful huldra; if 
she is simply a girl sitting for her mother, the activity is both needless and crude. The reclaiming of territory 
indeed leads to a hostile conversation in the garden. According to Liv’s phantasy, Maia is – due to the 
sitting – emotionally dependent on her mother, and she rejoices in advance of the idea of her mother 
nonchalantly sending Maia off. Here, the lonely daughter of the artist is probably revealing her most 
vulnerable point, being rejected too early and often; the experience beyond reflection. Be that as it may, 
                                                            
1 On the diagnostics of paranoia, see Leader (2011). Leader claims, interestingly, that “[d]elusion is thus a positive 
rather than negative phenomenon, an attempt at healing rather than a pathology in itself” (2011, 70). This makes the 
timing of the delusions an even more intriguing issue. 
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the idea is a blatant case of mind-attribution, of projecting her own fears and priorities onto an entirely 
different mind. The encounter is presented in a way that offers entry into two, radically different worlds. 
Liv remains exclusively within her paranoid scheme, and uses mind-attribution to keep her story intact. 
When the girls start to provoke each other, Maia turns out to be much more poignant: 
‘Tell me,’ she said. ‘Did you ever fuck anybody?’ She glanced at me sideways, still smiling her sweet, 
practiced smile. ‘Or are you just as cold as your nice, cold house…?’ (Drowning, 285) 
This is a crude question, of course, but it nevertheless gets to the point: does Liv ever touch anyone, 
mentally or physically, or does she exist only inside her cool detachment of a phantasy world? Liv tries to 
hurt Maia by asking whether her mother is still using her or not, with little influence. Instead, Maia soon 
hits much harder by hinting that Liv’s mother, being “a complicated woman”, has “some things she needs 
to think over” (Drowning, 286). With this short comment, Maia presents herself as one of the few persons, 
who are not ready to join in with the unreserved adoration of her mother, airing the issue about the real 
woman beyond the official portrait. The comment, alarmingly, also hints at some real conversations that 
may have occurred during the sitting sessions. Be that as it may, this competition in ridicule again 
foregrounds a massive contradiction in Liv’s mind reading. Earlier, I documented her obviously unlimited 
capacity to “read” other, adult minds (Crosbie, Thompson). Now she meets a girl of her own age and 
school, and she appears totally at a loss to read Maia’s reasons and desires. 
Liv’s delusional turn finds its apex during the episode of Kyrre’s disappearance. Liv has, after her trip, 
realized that Kyrre is the only person besides her mother whom she really loves. This, however, does not 
include sharing the experiences of her journey with Kyrre. Of course, Liv does not reveal to Kyrre her 
intrusion into Crosbie’s computer, and does not even think about it while Kyrre, for his part, is angry about 
the disappearance of his visitor. In the decisive scene, Liv, Kyrre and Maia meet in the meadow near Liv’s 
home. In Liv’s phantasy, Kyrre has decided to attack huldra directly and disregards the risks because he 
wants to protect the people he loves most in the world, and lead huldra away from their house. 
Nevertheless, Liv is appalled by Kyrre’s enchanted politeness towards Maia, by the old man’s ridiculous 
offer to give shelter to the young, homeless girl, and the two of them walking away as if lovers. Liv tries to 
stop them, but badly imprisoned by her own mind, she tells Maia that her mother has, after all, some 
unfinished business with her, and she should go to meet her immediately. In her phantasy, both Kyrre and 
Maia are planets circulating around her mother, as she is, not independent humans with their own desires 
and reasons. In reaction to their disappearance, Liv has a series of most unnatural perceptions and 
experiences, which I consider to be psychotic. After running around the woods and meadows in heavy rain, 
Liv collapses immediately upon arriving at home. The narrator adds one telling detail: even though she was 
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seriously ill, only her mother nursed her during the coming weeks, and no medical expert was ever invited 
to check examine her. The mental nature of her collapse needed no further witnesses.   
 
Disturbing novel, disturbing mind 
On my reading, the novel is so confusing because the narrator herself is so confused and increasingly 
paranoid in the storyworld. This is clearly a novel with two separate worlds (see Ryan, this volume), but 
because of the unreliable narrator, the reader has an unending task in checking details that are somehow 
confirmed or solely told from within the psychotic phantasies of the narrator.  The novel is fine-grained in 
showing the complex texture of natural and unnatural elements in the mind of the girl during her 
worsening crisis. The novel provides a number of hints about Liv’s history, about how her artist mother left 
her alone for days on end, in order to be able to concentrate on her own creative work. Both with Frank 
Verne and Maia, Liv nurtures the pleasant thought of her mother “sending off” the visitor. This is what Liv 
does – she spies on people from afar, imagines their minds, and sends them off rather than make any effort 
to connect with them by using the folk-psychological horse’s mouth method. The psychological level of the 
novel is densely crafted and credible, but cannot be fully explored within the range of this chapter.  
The novel problematizes both the benevolence and the nature of mind reading, as well as assumptions 
about automatically or naturally existing social or distributed minds. The issue is not primarily about the 
correctness of mind reading, it is about the performative difference between mind reading (as if trying to 
understand) and mind projection (attaching various contents for various reasons to other minds). The novel 
effectively undermines the assumption about the self-evidently well-intended process of mind reading. 
Equally, the reader of the novel has to struggle with de-constructing the assumptions about shared, social 
minds and shared worlds as the story becomes increasingly supernatural and delusional. At the end of the 
novel, Liv’s mind is effectively distinct, not only from the minds outside the island, but also from the minds 
of Kyrre, Ryvold, and her mother.   
As I have tried to argue above, the first-person narrator’s mind reading indeed seem to require such folk 
psychological checking and evaluation that we tend to do in everyday interaction. The interpretative 
dilemma seems to concern Herman’s (2011, 11) second claim. Within the novel’s story world, Liv seems to 
think and behave as if other minds were more or less transparent for her. The use of such discursive forms 
as thought report and free indirect speech, prior to any history of actual dialogue, surpasses the credible 
accessibility of other minds in everyday interaction. Paradoxically, the novel foregrounds both the constant 
everyday mind reading, and the qualitative difference between representing minds in fiction and everyday 
situations. This suggests that there is possibly a much longer way from the everyday guessing and knowing 
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of other minds to the explicit, immediate and verbally rich representations of the minds of fiction, than is 
often admitted.   
In recent literary theory, “conventional” tends to be quasi-automatically attached to “conversational” and 
“natural” narratives (e.g. Richardson 2013, 16). This recurrent juxtaposition gravely simplifies the place of 
the unnatural in many narratives, and the ways the unnatural is highly conventionalized in contemporary 
culture. When Liv’s understanding of her life breaks down, she discursively resorts to conventional 
Norwegian folktales, which provide her with a distinctively conventional and unnatural language for her 
paranoia and psychosis. The immersion into the mythic unnatural/supernatural contains very little by way 
of life experimentation; rather it works as a shelter against other people and against both maturation and 
sexuality. Burnside, on the other hand, provides his readers with a rare and nuanced vision of a mind 
growing increasingly confused. The novel does not offer the two worlds and realities as neatly separated 
and opposite; instead, the reader has to struggle back and forth inside the already flawed mental map of 
the narrator.   
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